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INTRODUCTION
As the digital economy evolves, commentators are speculating on
whether access technology or content will be the key commodity of the
information society.' Most agree, however, that some combination of the
two is necessary for electronic commerce to flourish.2 After all, without
adequate access technology, content cannot travel quickly or arrive in
high-quality form. Conversely, without high-quality content, demand for
new access technologies will lag. As online industries have grown, the
intersection of access and content technologies has emerged as perhaps
the key factor for success in the market. Yet this intersection has also
created tension over which legal rules should govern the emerging prod-
ucts.
In particular, information content providers who depend heavily on
copyright law are growing increasingly wary of advances in digital tech-
nology that allow manipulation of their content and potentially diminish
the effectiveness of their copyright protection? Technology firms, on the
1. See, e.g., Mike Yamanoto and Jeff Pelline, Battle lines drawn for control of Net,
News.com, May 10, 1999, (visited January 27, 2000) <http://www.news.com/
SpecialFeatures/0,5,36312,00.html>; Sandeep Junnarkar, Can Lycos compete without USA
Networks?, NEWS.COM, May 10, 1999 (visited January 27, 2000) <http://www.news.com/
News/Item/0,4,36334,00.html>.
2. See Yamainoto & Pelline, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., RIAA threatens to sue Lycos over MP3, News.corn, March 25, 1999 (visited
January 27, 2000) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,34250,00.html>.
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other hand, are looking more and more at developing products which
provide low-cost, high quality access to content without restriction,'
Thus, as technologists work feverishly to find new ways to free up in-
formation, content providers are fighting just as hard to constrain access
in order to prevent market-killing duplication and distribution of their
works.5
These two codependent yet clashing interest groups recently met on
the political battlefield in Washington D.C. in the fight over section
1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),6 a set of provi-
sions limiting the use of technology to access copyrighted works and
prohibiting the development and manufacture of technologies that en-
able certain kinds of access.7 The copyright industries emerged
victorious from the 1201 battle, inserting strong prohibitions on access
and device creation into federal copyright law.' The technologists were
less successful, managing only to win seven complex and narrow ex-
emptions to the access prohibitions9 and failing to prevent the passage of
strict restrictions on device innovation.'0
The battle over 1201 teaches many useful lessons about the Ameri-
can information society and what our future may look like if content
industries continue to dominate the national political domain. It presents
a concise picture of who represents major copyright content providers,"
what the terms of the debate are, 2 and the potential downside for the
Silicon Valley if it continues to employ its "Let's ignore Washington"
mentality. 3  More importantly, however, the battle over 1201
4. Such devices have typically been the bread and butter of successful Internet technol-
ogy. Previous killer apps such as email, ftp, and web browsers essentially function as low-
cost, high quality means to receive and access content from others. The PalmPilot and other
mobile desktop apps promise the same revolutionary gain for technology users.
5. One may be able to picture this clash better through the metaphorical imagery of
Manuel Castells' information cities. See Frank Webster, Theories of The Information Society
200-202 (Routledge 1995) [hereinafter Webster]. While technologists and content providers
are not all located in distinct geographically cities, one can imagine Los Angeles representing
content providers and Silicon Valley representing technologists, each linked to the other via
proximity and economy, yet having drastically divergent cultures and political manifestations.
6. Digital Millennium Copyright Act [hereinafter DMCA], Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) § 1201 [hereinafter 1201].
7. For a detailed analysis of this political battle, see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be
Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech L. J. 519 (1999) [hereinafter Samuelson].
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (1999).
9. See id. § 1201(d)-(j).
10. See id. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
11. The main sponsor of the DMCA was Rep. Coble. Other sponsors included Sen.
Hatch and Reps. Hyde, Frank, Conyers, Bono, McCollum, Berman, Paxon, and Pickering.
12. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 521-22.
13. See Presidential hopefuls mine Silicon Valley, News.com, May 3, 1999, (visited De-
cember 22,1999) <http://wvw.news.com/News/Item/0-1005-200-341992.htnl>.
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demonstrates a fundamental shift in the scope and power of American
intellectual property laws that control access to information. Restrictions
previously based on property-like rights of display, duplication, and distri-
bution have now begun to shift toward behavior-based, criminal
law-like restrictions on individual behavior and technological innovation,
regardless of whether property rights are violated or not. Such a shift rep-
resents a dangerous deviation from the delicate public/private balance that
intellectual property laws have thus far attempted to maintain.
14
This paper will focus on this shift from property rationales to behavior
rationales as a demonstration of how the public/private balance of copy-
right is in jeopardy if we continue to allow policies like 1201 to become
law without critiquing them through the appropriate analysis. Part II of this
paper examines the provisions of 1201, highlighting the key issues that
demonstrate its behavior-based rationale. Part E[[ demonstrates why laws
that attempt to regulate behavior are more properly rationalized as criminal
laws, not property laws. Part IV evaluates the effectiveness of 1201 using a
criminal law rationale, looking first at the balance between access restric-
tions and access allowance, then at restrictions on the creation of access-
enabling devices. Part V suggests modifications to 1201 that promote a
more consistent and balanced implementation of its behavioral-based
goals.
I. A NEW ERA IN LEGAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
A. Section 1201: The Shift From Controlling Exploitation
to Prohibiting Access
In 1998, Congress made a subtle but significant change to the federal
copyright balance. As part of passing the DMCA, Congress enacted Sec-
tion 1201, which prohibits any person from circumventing technological
protection measures (TPMs) that effectively control access to a copy-
righted work 15 and from manufacturing any devices whose primary
purpose is to enable the circumvention of TPMs. 6
14. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). To circumvent a TPM means to "descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deacti-
vate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner ......
Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). A TPM effectively controls access to a work if it "in the ordinary course
of operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work." Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). The
1201(a)(1)(A) prohibition will not take effect for two years from enactment, due to the rule-
making proceedings in 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D), but for purposes of this paper, I will ignore the
effect of the moratorium except as an indication of rationale.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (prohibiting the manufacture, import, offer to public,
provision, or otherwise trafficking of circumvention technology that undermines TPMs that
effectively control access to copyrighted works); Id. § 1201 (b)(1) (prohibiting similar activi-
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To those who have been following the legislative development of
U.S. copyright policy, these provisions come as no surprise. From the
very beginning, the Clinton Administration has pushed the agenda of
high protection for intellectual property rights, with an especially strong
emphasis on copyright protection. Both the administration's White Pa-
per 7 and Framework for Global Electronic Commerce"2 tout robust
copyright protection as a key facility for building the American infra-
structure and economy in the information age. The DMCA and the anti-
circumvention provisions were part of this plan to increase protections. 9
Section 1201's prohibitions on circumvention add two new layers of
legal protection to copyrighted works.20 The first pertains to a person's
right to access copyrighted information, the second with mechanisms
that allow access. As to the first, the use of access controls is new to
copyright law because copyright has not historically concerned itself
with the user's ability to access a work. Display rights and performance
rights have long been protected,2' but if a work was on display or being
performed, copyright left access to that work to other fields of law, such
as contract (e.g., purchase of a ticket required for attendance of an
event), criminal (e.g., prohibition on stealing a book prevents access to
content), or tort (e.g., liability for misappropriating trade secrets restricts
access to information).' Section 1201 changes this division of legal
ties regarding circumvention technology that effectively protects any right of a copyright
owner). Section 1201's ban applies if the anti-circumvention device is "primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing," or "has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent," or "is marketed by [a manufacturer or an associate
known to the manufacturer] for use in circumventing" TPMs or the protection they offer. 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C), (b)(1)(A)-(C).
17. See U.S. Dep't of commerce Info. Infrastructure task force, intellectual property and
the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights 230 (1995).
18. See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce 9 (1997), (visited December 22, 1999) <http:lwww.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomml
ecomm.htm>.
19. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 521 (citing U.S. Gov't Working Group on Elec.
Commerce, First Annual Report (1998)). The anti-circumvention provisions were supposedly
included as an additional element of compliance with the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation Copyright Treaty. However, it appears as if such provisions are vastly excessive, given
the WIPO "adequate protection" standards for such laws. See id. at 530-31.
20. While the Senate report claims legislation prohibiting circumvention devices is not
unprecedented, previous legislation was limited to very narrow circumstances in particular
industries. See 105 S. Rpt. 190 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c)) (prohibiting devices whose pri-
marily purpose is to circumvent digital audio Serial Copy Management Systems); 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(e)(4) (prohibiting devices that primarily assist decryption of satellite signals); North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Art. 1707, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (same).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(6) (1999).
22. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(holding state trade secret law is not pre-empted by 17 U.S.C. § 301 because it has the "extra
1999-2000]
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protection. Instead of simply prohibiting the reproduction, display, or
performance of a work, copyright owners now have legal power to in-
hibit individuals from accessing their works, even if the accessors own a
copy and only want to view it themselves.
This extension represents a significant expansion in the scope of
copyright law. Display, performance, and reproduction all concern the
manner in which a copyrighted work is exploited. Allowing such actions
without consent of the copyright owner would quickly diminish the
value of the work. For example, allowing the public to copy a popular
novel with impunity would eliminate the need to buy it from the store,
thereby depriving not only the author of incentive to write the novel, but
also depriving the publisher of any incentive to reproduce and dissemi-
nate it.
Controlling access, on the other hand, moves from the realm of pro-
hibiting exploitative use into the realm of controlling audience behavior.
Nothing in Section 106 of the Copyright Act allows copyright owners to
control who hears a song being played or who views a movie being
shown or who reads a copy of a book that has been made; it only allows
the owner to restrict the person who plays the song, projects the movie,
or makes the copy.23
In fact, the first sale doctrine of copyright law prohibits copyright
owners generally from extending their power into the audience realm.
24
Copyright owners who have attempted to extend their Section 106 rights
to audience control have often risked undermining the enforceability of
those rights via the doctrine of copyright misuse." Section 1201 now
officially allows copyright owners to extend their rights into the audi-
ence arena, seriously altering the balance between public and private use
elements" of improper access and improper disclosure of information). However, query now
whether, after 1201, the Copyright Act does not provide de facto preemption of state trade
secret law under the Second Circuit test. For example, circumventing a TPM would almost
certainly be seen as "improper means" under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433, 437-38 (1990). Or if a former employee brought an en-
crypted software program with him to a new job, accessing such a work would be both a
breach of his confidential duty to his former employer and a circumvention of the encryption
without consent of the owner. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Even though Section 301 ex-
plicitly limits preemption to rights analogous to Section 106 of the Copyright Act, these
actions are qualitatively similar to 1201 violations. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301, with Computer
Assocs., 982 F.2d at 716-17.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (defining rights of copyright owners).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'ANZA Research Int'l, Inc.,
523 U.S. 135 (1997) (prohibiting copyright owner from controlling secondary sales of copy-
righted shampoo bottles from foreign countries). But see Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
25. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Prop-
erty Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 151-58 (1999).
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of information. Under 1201, copyright owners have the power to control
both the work and the audience, the rough equivalent of granting physi-
cal property manufacturers the right to control both the sale and
subsequent use of their product (e.g., allowing automobile manufacturers
to control when you could drive your car or to whom you could offer a
ride). 6
The second new layer of protection concerns the means by which
one can access copyrighted information. As mentioned above, until the
passage of 1201, copyrights limited the manner in which works could be
exploited, not the means by which works could be accessed. 7 The long
history of copyright has always set limits on the scope of protection
against copying,2 but rarely, if ever, has it set limits on the method by
which works could be copied.2 Copyright law has historically governed
the circumstances and effect of information exchange but has left alone
the means by which the exchange occurred. The 1201 device controls
represent an extension of copyright ownership into the arena of means.
To further understand their implications, consider how device con-
trols like 1201 might play out in the universe of physical property. If
such controls were available for physical property, auto manufacturers
could control, post-sale, which mechanic you used to service your car,
what equipment you used to change a flat tire, or who made the keys you
used to open your door or start your engine." With digital works, access
devices represent mechanics and car keys, tools necessary to unlock and
utilize information. Allowing copyright owners to control these devices
extends their rights to the means by which one can access their works,
regardless of whether such access violates a Section 106 right. Such an
26. Section 1201's expansion of copyright beyond Section 106 is similar to the recent ef-
fort to expand rights using contract law via shrink-wrap and click-wrap licensing. See
generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Symposium, Intellectual
Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 809 (1998).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Factor One-transforming vs. superceding; Factor
Three-amount of work taken); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340 (1991); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
29. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
while Sony dealt with the use of a VCR to record TV programs, the analysis focused mostly
on whether using VCRs was fair use or not, not whether the method VCRs used to copy was
legal or not. See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (also
discussing legality of use but not means).
30. This kind of "tying" has historically been illegal under the anti-trust laws; therefore
we should be even more skeptical of allowing it as an extension of intellectual property mo-
nopolies.
1999-2000]
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extension affords a new layer of protection to copyright owners, above
and beyond Section 106.
B. The Shift From Exploitation to Access Signals a Significant
Deviation in the Rationale for Copyright Protection
So why are these shifts important? On one level, they simply seem like
logical extensions of copyright enforcement. If it is presumptively illegal
to display, duplicate, or distribute my work without my consent, it should
also be within my rights to prohibit you from accessing it without my con-
sent, as access would allow an easier violation of my Section 106 rights.
And if I can prohibit access, then I should surely be able to prohibit the
manufacturing or sale of a machine whose primary purpose is to allow
access, or the value of my right to exclude access will become worthless
under the burden of enforcement costs. By eliminating the audience's
ability to access my work without permission, I have lowered the costs of
investigating and enforcing my rights and increased the ease with which I
can charge for its use,3' thus potentially increasing my incentive, the utili-
tarian purpose for which American copyright law was established.32
Yet access control has much broader ramifications than simply in-
creasing enforcement efficiencies. In regulating access, copyright owners
are able to extend their control beyond their own property (the work) and
into the realm of others' commercial and personal behavior. As the discus-
sion below will show, the property laws governing exploitation do not
account for the value of socially beneficial behaviors and activities; they
simply account for the creation and maintenance of valuable property.
Without accounting for the potential benefits of behavior, property laws
tend to focus exclusively on absolute prevention of harm to the property.
This extreme position threatens to ignore and discourage socially benefi-
cial behaviors. Also, by ignoring beneficial behaviors, intellectual property
laws can restrict the rate and direction of innovation in industries that de-
pend on access to protected information, such as the technology industry.
33
Therefore, this new expansion into behavior control must be scrutinized
carefully under an analysis which focuses equally on the protection of in-
tellectual property and the potential benefits of behavior in order to avoid
lopsided policies that fail to maximize social value.
31. For the case in favor of copyright owners enforcing per use charges versus one-time
sales for digital works, see generally Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of
Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557
(1998).
32. See U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
33. For example, reverse engineering in the software industry. See Sega Enters. v. Ac-
colade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
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I. FROM A PROPERTY RATIONALE TO A CRIMINAL RATIONALE
A. The Difference Between Property and Criminal Law
The shift from controlling property rights to controlling behavior
represents a departure from the real property analogies used to conceptu-
alize and justify copyright. Instead, it represents an adoption of the more
behavior-oriented legal regime of criminal law. Traditional property law is
premised on Lockean theory: ownership of resources is necessary in order
to encourage investment in the development of public goods, leading to
maximum social valuation and utilization of resources.Y Individuals are
given exclusive rights in property in return for the public benefit of re-
source development, a societal quid pro quo. Intellectual property attempts
to strike a similar balance with information and ideas. Individual authors
and inventors are given exclusive rights in their respective writings and
discoveries for limited times in return for the public benefit of promoting
science and the useful arts.35 Thus, Section 106 rights are granted to
authors in exchange for the creation of original works and, after term expi-
ration, delivery of the work into the public domain.
However, property rights are limited to the property they protect. They
do not extend to other incentives for resource development,'6 even if such
incentives would dramatically increase investment in the property. They
are only concerned with protecting the integrity and exclusivity of the
property as an indicator of value. They also do not account for general
effects on society. Exclusive rights in ideas or land may, in the end, have
negative social results, 37 but such results do not nullify property laws.
Instead, the government tries to identify limited areas where monopoly
rights are necessary to promote the public benefit,3' even while generally
and legally discouraging monopoly rights elsewhere. 9
34. See John Locke, Two Treatises Of Government 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967); See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
35. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. S.
36. For example, labor improvements to land you own do not give you a stronger prop-
erty right in that land. Nor do we give stronger patent rights to those who utilize their patents
more economically over those who do not.
37. For example, an inventor of a life-saving drug could patent the drug and then deny ac-
cess to it unless patients paid exorbitant fees, disregarding the social benefit of saving the lives of
those who cannot afford the price.
38. "Thus, from the outset, federal patent law has been about the difficult business 'of
drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclu-
sive patent, and those which are not."' Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 148 (1989) (quoting 13 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
39. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1998).
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The primary goal of criminal law, on the other hand, is deterrence of
behaviors that cause social harm.40 There are two kinds of deterrence:
specific and general.4 ' General deterrence is aimed at preventing criminal
acts by potential defendants in the general community.42 Specific deter-
rence inflicts punishment on convicted defendants to leave them less
likely to engage in the crime again.43 According to classical utilitarian-
ism, the threat or imposition of punishment can reduce crime because,
"[p]ain and pleasure are the great springs of human action," and "[i]n
matters of importance, every one calculates." 4 In other words, according
to deterrence theory, "human beings generally act hedonistically and
rationally. That is, a person will act according to his immediate desires
to the extent he believes that his conduct will augment his overall happi-
ness." 45 Thus the key to implementing an effective criminal law lies in
the proper balance of punishing social harm and encouraging social
good to achieve a net social benefit. 6
To further demonstrate the difference between the two rationales,
consider an example from real property. I own a plot of land and sur-
round it with a fence to clearly signal what is mine. As a land owner, I
have the right to exclude the world from this land, and given the clear
markings of what is mine, any person who willfully enters my land has
violated this right. Because my right is a right of property, the degree of
trespass is of no consequence. Whether the trespasser has ventured one
foot or one mile onto my property, I am still entitled to the legal remedy
of an injunction barring them from being present. In fact, no matter how
costly or inefficient this enforcement may be, it is the law.47 All I have to
40. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries (American Law Institute) (1985) ,
§ 1.02(1) ("The general purpose of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are: (a)
to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens to inflict
substantial harm to individual or public interests;"); New York Penal Law § 1.05 (1998)
("The general purposes of the provisions in this chapter are: ... 6. To insure the public safety
by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized ... when required in the interests of public protection.").
41. See Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes
115 (6th Ed. Aspen 1997).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 2.03 [B] (Mathew Bender 2nd ed.)
(quoting Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in J. Bentham's Works 396, 402 (J. Bow-
ring ed. 1843)).
45. Id.
46. See Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry 238-43 (1984) (discussing net social gain
as a necessary prerequisite for criminal punishment).
47. See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 241 A.2d 276, 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968)
(holding that encroachment of fence onto neighbor's property, even if only by 15 inches,
entitled neighbor to demand removal under law). But see, e.g., Reese v. Borghi, 216 Cal. App.
2d 324 (1963) (holding that when "strictly necessary" to allow public access to land otherwise
[Vol. 6:1
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demonstrate is that I own the land and that you are on it: case closed.
Virtually no circumstantial reason for your trespass will save you.4"
In contrast, very few criminal laws have such bright line rules for li-
ability.49 Consider three separate scenarios where action is identical yet
liability is different. First case: I shoot and kill a random person for no
reason. Under most criminal laws, I am guilty of murder. Second case: I
have just found a person in bed with my spouse. I shoot in the heat of
passion. I am guilty of manslaughter. Third case: The person is trying to
kill me when I shoot him; I am not guilty due to self-defense. All three
scenarios involve the same action: my shooting another person to death.
Yet each has a different result-maximum liability, diminished liability,
no liability-based on the circumstances in which the behavior occurs.
The focus is not exclusively on the occurrence of an act (such as
entering someone's property) but also on the context and reasons for the
act (malice, revenge, self-preservation).
Property and criminal law rationales are often blurred by the overlap
between them. For example, destruction of property is both a crime and
a disincentive to invest. However, that is why there are both criminal and
civil causes of action for destruction of property. The criminal suit is to
deter social harm and promote beneficial behavior; the civil suit repairs
the value of the lost property. This same confusion occurs in crimes
against intellectual property owners. Those who duplicate digital
copyrighted works are often called software "pirates," thus implying that
these individuals "steal" intellectual property."
Yet one of the key traits of intellectual property is that it is nonrival-
rous. Copying a digital work does not remove it from the possession of
inaccessible, law requires mandatory easement over private property). While necessity can
function as a limitation on private property rights, it is extremely disfavored and requires the
court to find that there are absolutely no other reasonable avenues of access available to the
public. See icL
48. See Manillo at 282 (holding that infringement of property right, even unintentionally,
mandated injunctive relief). Some would argue that necessary is also a circumstantial defense
to trespass. However, necessity defenses are similar to fair use copyright defenses in the sense
that they balance the need for public versus private use of a resource and the proper allocation
of its value to all. Criminal law, on the other hand, focuses on the social benefit of a specific
actor's behavior in light of the unique circumstances of that behavior, distinguishing one ac-
tor's culpability from another's.
49. Those that do are usually either minor "taxable" offenses such as speeding or of-
fenses where the social harm is so great that deterrence must come at any cost. See, e.g.,
Model Penal Code § 213.1(1)(d) (statutory rape).
50. See The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105th Cong. 37 (1998) (Statement of Robert W. Holleyman, President and CEO,
Business Software Alliance) [hereinafter Holleyman testimony] (asserting that U.S. imple-
mentation of the WIPO treaties would "improve our ability to fight back against those who
would steal computer programs.").
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its owner; it simply creates more supply, thereby diminishing the value
of each copy. The legal protection of software is based on a property
right, a right that focuses on maintaining the value of property through
exclusive exploitation, not a criminal law where the owner has been
harmed as a member of society by the displacement of a valuable re-
source.5 Under property law, there is nothing technically wrong with
stealing property-legal violations occur solely under tort and criminal
laws for using property in a way that harms its rightful owner (e.g., con-
version or stealing). Pickpockets are not prosecuted or sued for
trespassing; they are prosecuted for larceny. A software "pirate" who
physically steals a diskette containing a copyrighted work cannot not be
sued for copyright infringement unless she duplicates or distributes it;
she can only be prosecuted or sued for stealing under criminal or tort
law. In other words, copyright does not prohibit use of a work unless
that use somehow alters the value of the work and its accompanying in-
centive. Criminal law, on the other hand, protects property owners from
the improper transfer of valuable works to others without their consent,
regardless of whether or not the value of the work is affected.
Finally, criminal and property law differ over the importance of the
method by which one violates the law. Property laws are generally un-
concerned with the actual method of infringement. When you walk onto
someone else's property, you are trespassing, regardless of whether you
are walking, running, or dancing. When you infringe a patent, it does not
generally matter if you knew you were infringing, 2 why you were in-
fringing, 3 or how you were infringing.54 Criminal law, on the other hand,
is often very concerned with the perpetrator's state of mind during the
act and the means by which the act was performed. 55
51. The Copyright Act does have criminal provisions for willful and for-profit infringe-
ment. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1999). The criminal theory here is one of deterring social harm;
the willful actor knows his act is infringing and without significant social benefit. Therefore
the penalty is not based on loss of value but disregard for the law.
52. Except for willful infringement treble damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1999).
53. Except for a very narrow experimental use exception. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.,
97 U.S. 126 (1877). Yet query whether the experimental use exception is really a criminal law
rationale for socially beneficial use in disguise.
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1999).
55. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 221 (defining burglary as entering a building at night
with intent to commit a felony); Cal. Penal Code § 244.5 (West 1999) (specifically outlawing
assaults upon police officers or firefighters with a stun gun or taser).
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B. Property Rationales Cannot Justify Access Controls;
Only Criminal Rationales Can Do So
Property law and criminal law have distinct rationales: the first
maintains the value of property; the second prevents others from
misappropriating said value. Access controls essentially govern the
proper use and distribution of valuable content but do not control or
maintain the value itself; therefore, they must be based on a criminal law
rationale.
Consider the difference between the property laws and criminal laws
that govern exploitation of versus access to creative works. Copyright
law controls the manner of exploitation for original authored works. This
control is relatively consistent with the historical rationale for property
rules. If one cannot reasonably control the marketable use of one's prop-
erty, the property will be overused and thereby less valuable.16 For
example, if I am legally able to make a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa 7
at minimal cost, I will likely do so and sell it. As a rational economic
actor, I will then make as many copies as I can and continue to sell them
until the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost. Soon there will be
thousands of identical Mona Lisas available, making the original signifi-
cantly less valuable.
Controlling access to property, on the other hand, does not
necessarily affect a works inherent value. Assume there is still only one
Mona Lisa. Whether one person, one hundred people, or one million
people view the Mona Lisa every year does not affect its value in the
marketplace.5 The price people are willing to pay to view the painting
may rise if fewer people are able to see it, but this change in value
reflects the market for access to the work, not the market for the work
itself. The market for access to the work governs how a work's value is
shared or displaced among the owner and the audience but does not
reflect or determine the inherent value of the work. A work that is shared
among millions of audience members is not less valuable; its value has
simply been spread from the copyright owner to the audience for the
work. Thus, because property laws are designed solely to protect the
value of the work and do not account for displacement between owner
and audience, they cannot properly justify access controls.
56. See Hardin, supra note 34 (The Tragedy of the Commons).
57. For purposes of this example, assume the Mona Lisa is still protected by copyright
and not in the public domain.
58. For instance, private collectors are often willing to purchase famous paintings for
their home galleries for more money than public museums. Therefore, the number of viewers
is a less significant indicator of value in comparison to the number of copies of the work
available.
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Criminal law, on the other hand, accounts for displacement of value.
Just as we protect physical property from being stolen (an act that does
not diminish its value but does harm the owner by displacing its value to
the criminal), we can rationalize protecting copyrighted works from be-
ing accessed without consent as protecting the copyright owner from
harm, even if the work's value remains unharmed.
In addition to preventing harmful displacement, criminal law also
promotes displacement when the acts in question ultimately prove bene-
ficial to society. For example, it is sometimes necessary and beneficial to
break the law: e.g. when police must steal a car to apprehend criminals
or an ambulance must speed to rush a dying person to the hospital. In
these situations, the social benefit of law enforcement or life preserva-
tion outweighs the loss to owner of the stolen car or the risk of accident
on the way to the emergency room. The net social benefit of these ac-
tions justifies the displacement of the car's value from the owner to the
emergency user and the possible harm from running a red light.
Just as criminal law recognizes that the prevention of harm must be
balanced with promotion of beneficial acts, so should laws on access
control. Controlling access can prevent improper displacement of value,
but it can also restrict the benefits of many legitimate uses of that infor-
mation.60 Property laws not only fail to account for any displacement of
value, but they also fail to distinguish between beneficial displacements
and harmful ones. Thus, access controls must be based on a criminal law
rationale in order to account for socially beneficial behavior and maxi-
mize net social wealth.
III. ANALYZING SECTION 1201 UNDER
A CRIMINAL LAW RATIONALE
To truly distinguish criminal and property rationales, one must look
at what they attempt to control and why. Property rights control use of
valuable property to make sure it does not lose its value. Criminal laws
control behavior to make sure social harm does not outweigh social
59. Unlike copyright infringement, where damages are estimated based on the loss of a
work's value, or the fair use defense where the market for the copyrighted work is taken into
account, 1201 violations pay no attention to infringement damages or market effect. Compare
17 U.S.C. § 1201 with Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985).
60. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j); Samuelson, supra note 7, at *543-45 (suggesting
many beneficial actions that could violate 1201). See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (implying that dissemination of unprotectable phone numbers
was an appropriate displacement of valuable information under the copyright laws).
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benefit. As this section will demonstrate, access controls such as 1201
make no attempt to determine whether a circumvention has a significant
effect on the value of copyrighted works or not. It simply outlaws acts of
circumvention and the production of devices that enable such acts, both
considered socially harmful by copyright owners. The exceptions to the
access prohibitions represent social benefits that counterbalance poten-
tially harmful circumvention. Therefore, in order to properly evaluate
1201, one must use a criminal law rationale to fully account for both the
potential harms and benefits it attempts to regulate.
A. Section 1201(a)(1) Prohibitions on Access
Having determined that access controls should be analyzed under a
criminal law rationale, this Part shall examine 1201(a)(1) to see when
and how it adheres to this rationale and where it diverges from it and
why.
1. A Textual Analysis of 1201(a)(1) Supports a Criminal Rationale
The anti-circumvention access prohibitions of 1201 contain within
their text elements of criminal law deterrence theory, not property rights.
For example, 1201(a)(1)(A) states "no person shall circumvent a tech-
nology protection measure that effectively controls access to [a
copyrighted work]."6 It focuses on the actor and his behavior.62 Compare
this with Section 106 of the Copyright Act: "the owner of copyright un-
der this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following ... ,63 The language here emphasizes the ownership of the
copyright and the right of that owner to exclude or grant permission to
others regarding the exploitative use of their work--"rights against the
world," as they are commonly called. The text of Section 106 is primar-
ily concerned with maintaining the value of the copyright through
exclusive rights. The text of 1201, on the other hand, primarily concerns
controlling the behavior of any person who circumvents a TPM on an),
copyrighted work, regardless of the effect it has on the value of that
work. '4
61. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
62. Or as Professor Benkler described the provisions of 1201, "their primary institutional
attribute is prohibiting the use and communication of information." See Yochai Benkler, Free
As the Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 413 (1999) (challenging 1201 on constitutional grounds).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
64. Also, compare the focus on the behavior of the actor in 1201(a)(1)(A) with Section
210.1 of the Model Penal Code: Criminal Homocide ("A person is guilty of criminal homicide
if he ... causes the death of another human being.").
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2. Section 1201's Social Benefit/Social Harm Balance
Supports a Criminal Law Rationale
Section 1201 also seeks to promote a social benefit/social harm
balance.6' Section 1201(a)(1)(A) prohibits any circumvention of a
TPM that effectively protects a copyrighted work. In almost every
situation covered by this section, there is potential for circumvention
to produce some social harm to the copyright owner. For example, if a
software pirate circumvents a TPM to duplicate and distribute the
software for free around the world, this action would clearly harm the
copyright owner and in turn, create less incentive to create software in
general, thus diminishing the well-being of society.
Section 1201 also includes exemptions for seven socially benefi-
cial circumventions.66 These include exemptions for nonprofit libraries,
archives, and educational institutions; law enforcement, intelligence,
and other governmental activities; reverse engineering of computer
programs; encryption research; parental control over access by minors
to material on the Internet; protection of personally identifying infor-
mation; and security testing. 67 Each of these categories represents a
type of behavior where Congress felt the social benefit of the circum-
vention outweighed the possible social harm. For example, section
1201(f) allows legitimate software developers to circumvent TPMs in
order to achieve interoperability.6 The purpose of this exemption is "to
foster competition and innovation in the computer and software indus-
try." ' 9 Thus, even though some social harm (displacement of value)
might arise out of competing software developers circumventing each
other's TPMs, Congress weighed the balance of social harm and social
benefit and concluded that the law should allow for such behaviors to
occur.
70
65. According to Hollywood's lobbyists, however, it appears that copyright owners
should control every facet of what Americans do with digital information, thus assuming that
any and all circumventions are socially harmful and none beneficial. See Pamela Samuelson,
The Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134. While this argument technically still has a
behavior-based criminal law rationale, the refusal to acknowledge any social benefit from
circumvention provides such a lopsided imbalance so as to appear to be a property-based
"rights against the world" rationale.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)-(j).
67. See id. However, these are not the only socially beneficial instances of circumven-
tion. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
69. 105 S. Rpt. 190.
70. There is no mention in the legislative history of 1201 regarding how these efforts
might affect the property values of the underlying copyrighted work, except for a citation to
Sega v. Accolade, discussed infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text, a case holding that
infringing research necessary for interoperability was fair use. While the Sega court did con-
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Other exemptions have even less relation to the purpose of prop-
erty rights. For instance, section 1201(h) exempts efforts by parents to
circumvent TPMs in order to monitor exposure of their children to the
Internet.7' Again, Congress determined that parental control of content
was socially beneficial. The rationale behind this exemption was to
support "the voluntary efforts underway ... to empower parents to
supervise and control the material their children access from the Inter-
net. ' 2 While this exemption may raise concerns regarding First
Amendment and privacy issues, there is no consideration in the legis-
lative history of its effect on the value of copyrighted works or
incentive for authors.
Finally, when one looks at the 1201(e) exemption for law en-
forcement, one sees the classic social harm/social good balance that
criminal law attempts to strike. Just as law enforcement is a defense to
homicide or theft,73 it is also a defense to 1201 circumvention. 4 The
House conference report on the law enforcement exemption states that
it "will permit the continuation of information security activities that
protect the country against one of the greatest threats to our national
security as well as our economic security [i.e. encryption of terrorist
communications].,75 Compare this to section 3.07 of the Model Penal
Code: Use of Force in Law Enforcement, "the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or
assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest."'76 Both rationales are
based on the benefit gained from committing acts that are commonly
construed as socially harmful in order to maintain the security of soci-
ety via law enforcement. There is no connection to "rights against the
world" or maintaining the value of property in either provision.
3. The Librarian of Congress Study and Rulemaking Process
Supports a Criminal Law Rationale
In addition to the behavior-based language of 1201(a)(1)(A) and
the categorical exemptions for access rights, one can also see the
duct an analysis of the economic effect of interoperability research (concluding displacement
of value was proper and did not have a material effect on the value of the copyright), the Sen-
ate report provides no discussion of this analysis nor draws any connection between TPMs
and their effect on property values.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(h).
72. 105 S. Rpt. 190.
73. See Model Penal Code § 3.07.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e).
75. H.R. Conf. Rpt. 105-796 (Oct. 8, 1998) (emphasis added).
76. Model Penal Code § 3.07.
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criminal rationale in the noninfringement study and rulemaking
sections. Sections 1201(a)(1)(A)-(D) delay the enforcement of the
anti-circumvention access prohibitions for two years from the date of
enactment in order to allow the Librarian of Congress to "make the
determination in a rulemaking proceeding.., whether persons who are
users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be ... adversely
affected by [the anti-circumvention access prohibition] in their ability
to make noninfringing uses ... of copyrighted works. 77 In other
words, the provision enables the Librarian to exempt certain classes of
users or works when necessary to preserve what Professor Samuelson
has categorized as "socially valued noninfringing uses."7' The statute
further instructs the Librarian to consider:
* the availability for use of copyrighted works;
" the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival,
preservation, and educational purposes;
" the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of
TPMs has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing, scholarship, or research;
" the effect of circumvention of TPMs on the market for or
value of copyrighted works; and
" such other factors as the Librarian considered appropri-
ate.
79
The Librarian's rulemaking process focuses on whether the anti-
circumvention rules inhibit socially beneficial outcomes. Are they in-
hibiting criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research? Are they diminishing the availability for use of works for
nonprofit archival, preservation and education purposes? 0 Clearly,
Congress did not want these new rules to diminish or destroy the bene-
fits that come from the proper uses of information, even if those uses
involve the circumvention of TPMs and occur without the consent of
the copyright owner. In other words, Congress wanted to make sure
that beneficial uses of copyrighted information continue and are not
inhibited by 1201(a)(1). If Congress simply wanted to outlaw all anti-
circumvention acts (a property model), it would not have instituted a
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
78. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 547.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i-v).
80. The study is to take into account the effect of circumvention on the market and value
of copyrighted works, but this is only one factor and seems to be more of a concern over so-
cial benefit versus harm than loss of value.
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rulemaking procedure to determine categorical exemptions; it would
have simply mandated an absolute prohibition. Congress' insistence on
allowing the Librarian to affirmatively exempt socially beneficial
categories of TPM circumvention reinforces the underlying criminal
law rationale behind the statute.
4. Section 1201's Legislative History Supports
a Criminal Law Rationale
The legislative history of 1201 also speaks in criminal law terms.
For instance, a major reason for passing 1201 was to supposedly put
the United States in compliance with the WIPO Copyright Treaties."
One of the provisions of the treaties was the implementation of ade-
quate deterrence measures to protect copyrighted works. 2 According
to Robert Holleyman, president of the Software Business Alliance, to
"meet the 'deterrence' requirement of the Treaties, national imple-
mentation must provide for remedies sufficient to act as such a
deterrent. [Section 1201] accomplishes this goal ....." Property rules
are not about deterrence; they are about maintaining the value of prop-
erty. Thus, when a copyright is infringed, the remedies of injunction
and damages serve to compensate the property owner and prevent
further loss, not necessarily to deter the infringer from inflicting addi-
tional social harm. Only when infringement is willful do punitive
damages and criminal liability become factors. 3 Unless an act is will-
ful, deterrence will play little to no part in preventing it.'
In addition, members of Congress used criminal metaphors to sell
1201 to their colleagues. One speaker before the House Judiciary
Committee compared circumventing a copyright TPM to breaking into
a locked library in order to access books, stealing newspapers from a
vending machine in order to copy articles, and cracking open the vault
at the National Archives to get a hold of the copy of the Declaration of
Independence housed within. 5 Another speaker compared anti-
circumvention devices to burglar's tools and the act of circumvention
to "the act of breaking and entering into a home or warehouse." 6
81. The U.S. was substantially in compliance already, however. See Samuelson, supra
note 7, at 528 n.47.
82. See id. at 529.
83. The rationale for deterring willful infringement is based on criminal law as a means
of maintaining social order and respect for the law. See supra note 51.
84. See Kadish and Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 115-19.
85. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 539 n.l 10 and accompanying text.
86. See Holleyman Testimony, supra note 50.
1999-2000]
20 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
While these metaphors are inaccurate depictions of circumvention, 
7
the intention to frame 1201 as a law protecting society and deterring
social harm seems clear. Several congressmen accepted this rationale
and included it in the formal presentation of the bill.
88
B. 1201(c)(1)'s Defense of Fair Use Supports a
Criminal Law Rationale
As mentioned, supra, the language of 1201(a)(1) focuses on the
behavior of the actor.89 Section 1201(c)(1) provides a defense to these
behavioral controls, the traditional copyright defense of fair use." Yet
although they share the same name, the fair use defense to copyright
infringement serves a different purpose than the 1201(c)(1) defense.
Fair use in copyright infringement serves as a explanation for why one
needs to utilize someone else's property, even though duplication pre-
sumptively diminishes the property's value.9' In section 1201, fair use
serves as an explanation for why you need to access someone else's
property, even though such an act is generally considered to create so-
87. Here is a perfect example of where the analogy of physical property to intellectual
property breaks down. In order to obtain a fair use copy of a digital work, you do not need to
invade the physical property of the copyright owner. See David Friedman, Comment, In De-
fense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of
Self-Help." 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1151 (1998). You could simply access the work through a
computer network and make a copy without disturbing the original data. In fact, many times
the original data may be on a computer memory device which you have purchased (CD, disk-
ette) or on your own personal property (hard drive). The examples of stealing a newspaper or
the Declaration of Independence are even more absurd. There, the crime would be the taking
of the physical paper embodying the information, not the information itself. I doubt the Na-
tional Archives would care if you copied a digital .pdf file of the Declaration off their web
site, but they would certainly care if you took the original paper copy from the vault because
they would no longer have it. If these takings were only to make fair use copies and then to
return the original, one could not say that any harm had come to the value of the property; the
only reasonable justification for prohibiting these acts is a criminal justification of keeping the
peace. If people were allowed to break into private physical property in order to make fair
use, there would be increased social disorder and increased fears of diminished personal secu-
rity and privacy. It is for these reasons that the aforementioned examples seem socially
harmful, not because of their effect on the property values of the works in question.
88. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 539 n. 111 (citing House Manager's Report on 1201,
which characterizes circumvention to get unauthorized access as "the electronic equivalent to
breaking into a locked room to obtain a copy of a book").
89. See supra Part IV.A.I.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1); Samuelson, supra note 7, at 539-40.
91. The traditional fair use doctrine is based on two property theories. First, that the use
does not significantly devalue the property. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (factor four); Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) ("[1]f so much is taken, that the value of the original
is sensibly diminished.., that is sufficient.., to constitute a piracy pro tanto.") (Story, J.);
Second, fair use furthers the constitutional goal of promoting the sciences by creating new
works. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966).
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cial harm. Thus, if one circumvents a TPM to access a copyrighted
work for a fair use, one is essentially employing two fair use de-
fenses-one to justify the behavior of circumvention and the other to
justify the "trespass" onto the copyright owner's intellectual property
right. If 1201's prohibitions are based on the criminal law rationale of
controlling social harm caused by behavior, then 1201(c)(1)'s fair use
defense against unlawful behavior must be analyzed under a criminal
law rationale as well.
Criminal defenses come in two flavors: justifications and ex-
cuses.92 Each has its own rationale for excusing liability of the actor. In
order to understand how the 1201(c)(1) fair use defense plays into the
criminal law rationale of the 1201 scheme, we must first understand to
which type of defense fair use is most analogous.
1. Justifications
A justification defense is one that defines conduct "otherwise
criminal, which under the circumstances is socially acceptable and
which deserves neither criminal liability nor even censure." 93 It is "a
good thing, or a right and sensible thing, or a permissible thing to
do."94 In other words, it always promotes more social benefit than
harm-a net social benefit.9 For example, a law that prohibits any per-
son from exceeding a speed limit of 55 miles per hour may diminish
the frequency and severity of fatal accidents, but it also inhibits the
ability of police officers to catch those most likely to cause such acci-
dents. Thus, speeding laws are inapplicable to law enforcement
officials in the pursuit of criminals.96 The social benefit of catching
criminals outweighs the potential harm of accidents along the way. To
hold law enforcement officers liable for speeding in pursuit of crimi-
nals would allow more harm than good and thus diminish overall
social wealth.
92. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984).
93. Peter D. W. Heberling, Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on
Statutory Reform, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 914, 916 (1975).
94. Dressier, supra note 44, at § 16.03 [B] (quoting J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses,
Freedom and Responsibility 6 (Herbert Morris ed. 1961)).
95. See Greenawalt, supra note 92, at 1897. Other theories such as Moral Forfeiture,
Moral Rights, and Superior Interest have been used to rationalize justifications, but these are
essentially variations of the net social benefit theory. See Dressier, supra note 44, at § 17.02.
For simplicity, I will confine my discussion to the net social benefit theory.
96. See Model Penal Code § 3.03 (justifying violation of the criminal laws when required
to execute specific public duties).
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Justifications are not only applicable to those enforcing the laws.
The criminal law also allows private actors to violate laws in the name
of self-protection, the protection of others, the protection of property,
assisting law enforcement, as a guardian for others, or when faced with
a choice between two evils.97 Thus, every member of society is entitle
to justify their behavior if it results in a socially beneficial outcome.
When looking over the list of justified actions, a common trait
emerges-they are all broad categories of behavior. For example,
many actions in our society potentially fall under the labels of pro-
tecting other people or protecting property. There are an almost
unlimited number of actions that could be framed as a choice between
two evils. Yet if almost all of human behavior were justified, why have
criminal laws at all?
The answer is, as it must necessarily be, that these categories have
limitations on them. These limitations are designed to ensure that justi-
fication defenses are only applied in circumstances where social
benefit always outweighs social harm. Thus, for self-protection, "the
use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the ac-
tor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other per-
son on the present occasion."" The requirements of immediate
necessity and unlawful force are imposed on the actor to ensure that he
was not able to flee the situation before resorting to violence
(lessening the social harm of violence) and was not opposing law en-
forcement (inhibiting the social benefit of enforcing the laws).
However, even with these requirements, courts are given broad
language and discretion for the application of justifications. For exam-
ple, consider the ongoing controversy over the use of the self-
protection justification in battered-woman syndrome defenses to mur-
der.99 Many experts have testified that women who are battered rarely
know when their batterer will strike next or how.'0° Experts have also
shown that batterers typically escalate their pattern of violence over
time, often resulting in the murder of the victim.'1 ' Thus, battered
women often fear imminent death but do not know when it will occur.
As a result, when they do retaliate, many kill their batterers while he
sleeps.'2 Under traditional justification theory, these actions are not
97. See Model Penal Code §§ 3.01-3.11.
98. Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (emphasis added).
99. See generally Robert F. Schopp, et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testi-
mony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 45 (1994).
100. See generally Lenore e. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984).
101. See id.
102. See Schopp, supra note 99, at 45-6.
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immediately necessary; the victim could have simply left the house or
called the police. Yet because these women are often financially, psy-
chologically, or emotionally dependent on the batterer, they often
believe that they will eventually be killed by their spouse and that at-
tacking them in their sleep is the only feasible (and thus immediately
necessary) means of protecting themselves. While courts are split on
the validity of this defense,'03 it is clear that under certain circum-
stances, courts have found such actions to promote the social benefit
of protecting battered women and children from abusive and poten-
tially murderous relationships. The discretion to allow such actions
indicates the potential breadth of justifications in the criminal law.
Broad justifications are also applicable to the protection of prop-
erty. Normally, the property justification excuses the use of force to
prevent the illegal taking of property from one's person or home."" Yet
consider this principle on a broader scale. For example, in the movie
Volcano, starring Tommy Lee Jones and Anne Heche, a group of po-
lice officers and fire fighters move several cars into the path of
oncoming lava in order to save half the city from being engulfed in
flames. As this action is not part of enforcing any law, the law en-
forcement justification does not apply. However, the action is part of
an effort to protect property and lives. Thus while the protection of
property justification is normally applied to preventing the theft or de-
struction of property, one could easily see it expanded to allow the
stealing or destruction of property when necessary to preserve more
valuable property and save lives. The social benefit of saving half a
city easily outweighs the social harm of stealing and destroying a few
cars. Upon an appropriate examination of the circumstances, justifica-
tion defenses demand such broad application to ensure that socially
beneficial behaviors are not improperly deterred by existing criminal
laws.
2. Excuses
Excuses are similar to justifications in that they serve as affirma-
tive defenses to criminal liability. Yet excused actions do not produce
socially beneficial results; instead, they represent situations where de-
terrence through punishment serves no purpose.
There are two basic situations where excuses are allowed. The first
occurs when the actor is inhibited from making a rational decision. For
example, if a mentally incompetent person walks into a store, picks up
103. See id. at 47 n.8.
104. See Model Penal Code § 3.06(1).
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an item, and walks out without paying, punishing such a person will
have little to no deterrent effect on prohibiting the social harm from
occurring again. Unless they know why they are being punished and
that what they did was wrong, people cannot make a rational decision
about whether or not to do it again.
A second type of excuse occurs when the actor's decision-making
process is so skewed in the direction of social harm as to be considered
abnormal or extreme. For example, when an actor is forced to commit
a crime at gunpoint or under threat of a loved-one being harmed. Be-
cause the actor would not have otherwise committed the crime absent
the external factors, there is no point in attempting to deter them with
punishment.
3. The Critical Policy Distinctions Between Justification and Excuse
There are also policy distinctions between justifications and ex-
cuses. Justifications represent actions that society wishes to promote.
We want cops to chase after robbers; we want fire engines to run red
lights to save children; we want potential victims to be able to defend
themselves against murderers. We also want third parties to assist jus-
tified actions. Private citizens must pull over to clear the road for law
enforcement and emergency services; martial arts and weapons in-
structors are allowed to teach us how to shoot, kick and kill to protect
ourselves. In fact, the social benefit of justified actions is so great that
we prohibit others who are capable of stopping them from interfer-
ing.05 One should not stop a police officer from speeding or a fire
engine from running a red light. Justifying an action sends out a mes-
sage that people should perform the action, not simply that they will
avoid punishment. Justifications provide incentive for people to act in
society's best interest.
Excuses, on the other hand, relieve the actor of blame due to the
circumstances, but the action itself is still one that society hopes to
prevent.' Interference with excused actions is encouraged and assist-
ing such actions is wrongful. 7 So, for example, A kidnaps B's
daughter. A tells B to rob the bank and give him all the money or B's
daughter will die. A's accomplice, C, drives B to the bank where B
robs it. Even though C is only assisting B in committing the crime for
which B is excused, C should still be held liable because he knows that
B is under duress, and thus that the commission of the act is still
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causing social harm. In contrast, if C were a bystander at the robbery
who uses his car to drive the security guard in pursuit of B at speeds
exceeding the posted speed limit, he should not be held liable because
the social benefit of assisting law enforcement outweighs the harm of
speeding.
4. Section 1201 (c)(1)'s Fair Use Defense Falls Within the
Criminal Justification Rationale
When applying a criminal law rationale to the 1201(c)(1) fair use
defense, it emerges as a justification defense because (1) it allows in-
fringement when necessary to produce net social benefits,' 5 (2) it
encourages actions that produce such benefits,' 9 and (3) it provides the
court with broad discretion to balance circumstantial factors in deter-
mining whether net social benefit exists."
For example, consider four cases involving fair use and the use of
technology to access copyrighted works. In Sony v. Universal, the Su-
preme Court was asked to consider whether or not the makers of VCRs
were legally contributing to copyright infringement by allowing users
to copy broadcast programs off their televisions. ' The Court said no,
holding that because VCRs had a substantial non-infringing use
(allowing fair use "time-shifting" of programs so users could watch
them later), the potential harm of infringing uses was not significant
enough to hold the makers liable."2 In essence, the Court held that the
social benefit of time-shifting outweighed the social harm of possible
infringements both in terms of allowing the VCR companies to make
their devices and allowing users to use them."3 Thus, fair use provided
the justification for allowing the use of VCR technology to access
works.
In Sega v. Accolade,14 the Ninth Circuit held that copying an entire
software program into memory in order to de-compile it was fair use,
if the use was the only way in which a competing software company
108. See Heberling supra note 93.
109. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(analyzing fair use by assuming that if allowed, the use will become widespread).




113. See id. at 436 ("Respondents argue that ... supplying the 'means' to accomplish an
infringing activity and encouraging that activity through advertisement are sufficient to estab-
lish liability for copyright infringement. This argument rests on a gross generalization that
cannot withstand scrutiny.").
114. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
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could decipher the program to understand the ideas behind it."' Thus,
even though accessing the work constituted infringement, 6 the court
held that reverse engineering was a socially beneficial outcome."
7
Having arrived at a fair use conclusion, the court implicitly authorized
the means of access (reverse engineering) as justified."3
In Vault v. Quaid, a manufacturer of copy protection software sued
a manufacturer of copy-enabling software for contributory copyright
infringement."9 Following Sony, the Fifth Circuit held that Quaid's
copy-enabling software could provide users with fair-use backup cop-
ies of their programs, thus it had a substantial non-infringing use.'20
Here, again, fair use provided for a fundamental social benefit-the
allowance of back-up copies of software. Enabling access to the work
for such uses outweighed the potential harm of allowing access for
illegal copying.
Finally, consider Sega v. MAPHIA' 2' In this case, a Federal Dis-
trict Court held that providing tools to enable game software to be
copied from disks and posted to the Internet was contributory copy-
right infringement because using the tools was not a fair use.2' In its
analysis, the court relied on the Sony holding in deciding that the soft-
ware tools had no substantial non-infringing use.'3 In other words, the
harm caused by using the tools was so great that it outweighed any
potential benefit gained. Therefore, the use of the tools to access the
work was not a fair use and not justified.
Allowing circumvention of TPMs for fair use also follows the
policy of promoting the assistance of justified actions. If we assume
that making fair use of a work is a socially beneficial behavior, then
allowing circumvention of a TPM in order to enable fair use is simply
a means for assisting an actor in achieving that benefit. This
115. See id. at 1522 (holding copyright did not extend to ideas under the idea-expression
dichotomy).
116. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). But consider that MAI
may have been decided differently under a social benefit/harm analysis (hence the subsequent
modification to section 117 of the DMCA) and that Triad essentially was implicitly decided
under this analysis, 64 F.3d at 1336 (use of work for direct competition in service industry
with copyright owner sans creation of new work was socially harmful).
117. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 (determining that Accolade had made the copies "for a
legitimate, essentially non-exploitative purpose").
118. This is also supported by the exemption for interoperability in 1201 itself. See 17
U.S.C. § 1201(t).
119. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
120. See idU at 262.
121. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
122. See id at 688.
123. See id. at 685.
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"assisting" rationale closely resembles the rationale for allowing pri-
vate citizens to assist law enforcement officers in their duties, or to
rush dying victims to the hospital at illegal speeds, or to shoot and kill
an attacker before he kills an innocent person. These behaviors are all
justified behaviors in the criminal law because they allow and encour-
age socially beneficial outcomes. Circumvention of TPMs for fair use
serves the same purpose of allowing and encouraging social benefits,
therefore it should also be considered a justification.
Finally, fair use allows courts broad discretion to consider circum-
stantial factors in determining whether a use is "fair" and thus socially
beneficial. For example, Section 107 of the Copyright Act explicitly
states that the four factors of fair use listed are not limiting.24 In addi-
tion, courts have applied fair use to extremely diverse factual
situations, often times taking into account cutting edge technologies or
copying techniques which were not available or even considered when
Section 107 was enacted.1  Courts have realized that new technologies
and changing economic and industry circumstances demand case-by-
case determinations as to the effect various uses have on society. Thus,
fair use has essentially functioned as a justification defense to in-
fringement and 1201 is properly rationalized as a justification defense
to circumvention prohibitions.
C. Section 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) 's Prohibition of Devices are
Still Based Inappropriately on Property Rules
In criminal law, devices are rarely banned per se. With the
exception of illicit narcotics and assault weapons, most "devices" used
in criminal activities are at most regulated, not prohibited.'26 For
example, explosives, most firearms, and lockpicks -may be purchased
under qualified restrictions, but none are illegal to manufacture, offer
to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic. 27 These policies arise out of
the social benefit/social harm balance. While we recognize that these
devices may cause social harm, we do not ban them unless they have
no substantial beneficial use. For example, explosives help
124. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
125. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(VCRs), Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (decompiling object
code), Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (rap music parody), Re-
cording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1999) (MP3 digital music archives), American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913 (2nd. Cir. 1994) (photocopying for private corporate archives).
126. See, e.g., Assault weapon Ban Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R. 1809, 106th Cong.
127. Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 12303 (West. 1999) and Cal. Penal Code
§ 466 (%West. 1999) with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
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construction. Firearms help police, security services, and self-defense.
Lockpicks help law enforcement and locksmiths. Thus the potential for
socially beneficial outcomes rationalizes the risk of social harm.
Assault weapons and illicit narcotics, on the other hand, have few if
any socially beneficial uses in the civil population; therefore a ban is
justified.
Given the high standard for banning devices in the criminal law, it
is surprising that 1201's ban on devices is so absolute. There appears
to be no rationale for this ban, other than that these devices might al-
low one to circumvent a TPM, regardless of whether that
circumvention is justified or not. There is no social harm/social benefit
balance. Thus the device ban appears to be based on an absolute prop-
erty-like rationale instead of a balanced criminal law rationale. Under
a property rationale, any violation of an exclusive right is illegal. Sec-
tions 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) essentially allow copyright owners to
prevent the manufacture, sale, use, or importation of any device whose
primary purpose is circumvention of TPMs.'2 Thus, it grants copyright
owners exclusive rights without any consideration of the appropriate
harm/benefit balance.
IV. RECONCILING THE DIVERGENT RATIONALES OF 1201(a)(2) AND
(b)(1) WITH 120I(a)(1) AND (C)(1)
As shown above, 1201(a)(1) and (c)(1) follow the criminal law ra-
tionale of net social benefit, and thus are generally consistent with the
appropriate rationale for anti-circumvention legislation-behavior
control. However, the property rationale of 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) is
inconsistent with the criminal rationale of 1201(a)(1), 1201(c)(1), and
the overall purpose of the anti-circumvention provisions. Thus, in or-
der to prevent the device prohibitions from creating inconsistent
outcomes that undermine the purpose and effectiveness of 1201, the
device prohibitions must be reconciled with the rest of the statute.
128. Query whether this might raise a constitutional issue of overlaps between copyright
and patent The Senate report for 1201 begins "Tifle I encourages technological solutions" to
protecting copyrighted works. See 105 S. Rpt. 190. Encouraging technology has traditionally
been the province of patent law. It makes one wonder if 1201 would be better suited 18 titles
later in the U.S.C.
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A. The Access Exemptions of 1201(a)(1) Should be Broadened
to Include a Full Range of Justified Behaviors
The first step in this reconciliation is to expand the exemptions for
justified uses in (a)(1) and (c)(1). While the technology industries were
able to insert seven narrow access exemptions into 1201(a)(1), justifi-
cation policy in criminal law allows for broad categories that cover a
wide range of behaviors." By stating an absolute rule and then listing
exemption after exemption, Congress has demonstrated its strained
attempt to maintain the structure of "rights against the world" ap-
proach of property law in the anti-circumvention provisions, even
though the substance is based on shifting to a criminal social
harm/benefit approach.
1. Professor Samuelson's Suggestion
Pamela Samuelson suggests that a more appropriate approach to
1201(a)(1) would be to include a judicially-empowered "legitimate
uses" defense."3 The structure of such a doctrine corresponds more
accurately to the criminal justification rationale underlying 1201 as a
whole. Legitimate uses are essentially uses that provide a net social
benefit. Just as we allow for the use of violence in situations where it
is immediately necessary to prevent unlawful killings, we should allow
for the circumvention of TPMs when they result in a net social benefit.
A legitimate uses exemption also provides the appropriate forum
for considering the net social benefit of certain behaviors. In criminal
law, we allow broad categories of justification because we want triers
of fact to assess the social benefit and harm in each factual situation on
a case-by-case basis. Thus instead of exempting "use of firearms by a
person who has a gun pointed at his head and is about to die," we al-
low courts to determine if someone is justified in committing homicide
when "when the actor believes that such force is immediately neces-
sary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force."'' Such broad language allows courts to consider many different
self defense actions in many different contexts without restriction on
type of weapon, type of actor, time, place, etc. In much the same way,
the "legitimate uses" language would provide for a broad category of
justification in which fact-dependent situations that provide more so-
cial benefit than harm in promoting the sciences could be ascertained.
129. See supra, notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
130. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 539.
131. Model Penal Code § 3.04(l).
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We could, of course, simply ask Congress to add new specific ex-
emptions as they prove themselves socially beneficial, as suggested by
the 1201(a)(1)(A)-(D) rulemaking process. Yet if we continue to add
new items to the already long and confusing list of exemptions, we
start to defeat the purpose of having specific exemptions in the first
place. At that point, it would be simpler and more logical to create a
general defense that allows for socially beneficial circumventions,
rather than insisting on a painstaking and cumbersome legislative
amendment or rulemaking every time we discover another socially
beneficial use.
In addition, by limiting the exemptions to narrow industry-specific
practices, we risk prohibiting many socially beneficial behaviors that
may fall just outside those practices. Especially in areas of industry
where innovation happens quickly and practices develop over short
periods of time, depending on a rulemaking or amendment process to
exempt a valuable practice could result in the practice being obsolete
by the time the amendment is made. Plus, in the meantime, the general
prohibition and potential liability may have already discouraged the
practice from catching on, even though such a practice might have
been a significant leap forward in the field. Social harm and social
benefit are best measured as closely to the time of impact as possible.
Judges and juries presiding over recent real-life situations are in much
better positions to assess the net social balance than legislators work-
ing in a vacuum.
Finally, inserting the "legitimate uses" defense into 1201 would
encourage broad assistance from others to help socially beneficial cir-
cumventions. 132 This policy of assistance is an essential component of a
justified defense. Consider the following linguistic comparison. Sec-
tion 3.07(1) of the MODEL PENAL CODE states that "the use of force
upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor
MODEL PENAL CODE is making or assisting in making an arrest and
the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a
lawful arrest.'
3
Notice the assistance language. Now replace "use of force" with
the circumvention language of 1201(a)(1) and "lawful arrest" with
"legitimate use":
"The circumvention of a technological protection measure that
effectively protects a copyrighted work is justifiable when the
132. See Samuelson, supra note 7, at 532 n. 151 (suggesting that fair use circumventors
may need assistance, even if technically competent, but especially if not).
133. Model Penal Code § 3.07(1) (emphasis added).
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actor is engaging in or assisting in the engagement of a legiti-
mate use of the underlying work and the actor believes that
such circumvention is immediately necessary to effect a le-
gitimate use."
Such a provision offers courts a reasonable and balanced standard
by which to judge those who make and assist circumventions. It en-
sures a net social benefit and only encourages assistance when such a
benefit is reasonably expected. Thus, a broad "legitimate uses" ex-
emption would promote the assistance of justified circumventions and
make 1201 structurally and substantively consistent with its rationale.
B. The Device Prohibitions of 1201 Should be Reformulated
to Follow a Net Social Benefit Model
The second step toward reconciling 1201 should reformulate the
device prohibitions to follow a social harm/social benefit model. As
discussed, supra, the (a)(2) and (b)(1) device prohibitions extend the
exclusive monopoly of content owners beyond the boundaries of their
works and into the technology industries that create means of access.
Such a scheme not only deviates from the traditional limitation on
property rights-narrow relation to their subject matter-but also al-
lows content owners to indirectly control personal behavior.' 4 If
access control provisions are more properly rationalized under crimi-
nal law than property law, devices should be prohibited only if they
have no substantially beneficial uses, e.g., illicit drugs and assault
weapons. If circumvention devices can produce substantial net social
benefits, then they should be allowed.
Section 1201 currently prohibits all devices that are either (1) pri-
marily designed or are produced for the purpose of circumventing a
TPM, (2) have only limited commercially significant purposes other
than the circumvention of a TPM, or (3) marketed specifically for use
in circumventing a TPM' 35 None of these standards takes into account
social benefit or social harm, let alone the balance between the two. In
contrast, consider the fact that in criminal law, we allow the manufac-
ture of guns, even though their primary purpose, sadly, is often to
commit violent socially harmful crimes.'36 We allow Detroit to build
cars able to exceed 65 miles per hour, even though the primary
134. Samuelson suggests this was Hollywood's real agenda-to extend their monopoly
rights into the user realm and into other industries in order to secure their own content. See
Samuelson, supra note 7, at 553.
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
136. See, e.g., the tragedy in Littleton, Colorado.
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purpose of such speeding capacity violates a majority of driving laws.
The technologies that allow guns to fire and cars to speed have limited
legitimate commercially significant purposes other than shooting peo-
ple and speeding. 37 So why are they legal? Shouldn't we ban them,
just as we ban circumvention devices?
38
We allow such devices because we recognize that in specific con-
texts and for specific socially beneficial reasons, we want people to
use guns and drive fast.' 39 Devices enabling the circumvention of
TPMs are no different. By allowing copyright owners to prohibit the
manufacture, sale, and use of these devices, we are granting them
property-like rights, rights to exclude the world of such devices. Yet if
anti-circumvention laws are based on promoting social benefits and
deterring social harm, then the current device prohibition rationale
fails to distinguish between the likelihood of the two outcomes.
A more appropriate standard would be to prohibit circumvention
devices that are either (1) primarily designed or produced for the pur-
poses of illegitimate circumvention of a TPM, (2) have only limited
legitimate commercially significant purposes other than the illegiti-
mate circumvention of a TPM, or (3) are marketed specifically for the
illegitimate circumvention of a TPM. Inserting the "legitimate use"
standard into the device prohibitions both synchronizes them with
broad 1201(a)(1) justification standards and aligns them with the ap-
propriate net social benefit rationale. '4°
CONCLUSION
The conflict between content and access technology has only be-
gun to emerge in the digital economy. As each industry invests greater
stakes in its online future, the battle over controlling law and control-
ling interest will only increase in proportion. In such a battle, the
137. There may be some debate as to whether guns and fast cars are marketed specifi-
cally for shooting people or speeding, but one could easily see such uses being inferred if not
explicitly stated.
138. Notwithstanding the NRA and its strained defense of the Second Amendment, it is
somewhat absurd to think that Congress and the copyright lobby see anti-circumvention tech-
nology as a greater threat to society than firearms.
139. Perhaps we also allow these devices to exist out of respect for individual liberty and
the right to choose not to exhibit illegal behavior even when we have the capacity and the
capability.
140. Another possible solution would be to adopt the contributory copyright standard set
out by the Supreme Court in Sony. 464 U.S. at 442. Since the Court declared that allowing
substantial fair uses is socially beneficial, one could simply change the "substantial non-
infringing use" standard to a "substantial legitimate use" standard and insert into 1201(a)(2)
and (b)(1), preserving the same balance through analogous language.
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intellectual property interests of the content owners will continue to
dominate as long as a property-based model is the dominant rationale
behind federal law.
Perhaps more importantly, we will also continue to see socially-
beneficial activities being ignored and outlawed. Useful technologies
will continue to fall prey to laws that discard the critical social
harm/social benefit balance. If, as some commentators have postulated,
technological production plays a major role in social change, then the
loss of these activities and technologies will begin to shape the social
lives we lead as members of the information society.'4 ' Fundamental
social activities such as the ability to read a book, watch a movie, or
listen to music may undergo drastic alternations. Whether such alter-
nations are desirable or not remains to be seen, but unless we begin to
account for them in our laws, we may never know how much we have
lost or gained.
141. See Webster, supra note 5, at 195. If, as Daniel Bell writes, increases in productiv-
ity are the key to social change, then 1201 seriously threatens increases in the productivity of
access technology. See id. at 34. It is, in essence, protectionism for content industries at the
expense of technological productivity. If the Clinton administration truly hopes to foster and
promote the advancement of the U.S. economy into the information age, passing laws that
inhibit increases in productivity are among the last things they should want to do.
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